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Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War 
History Behind the Headlines, 2001 
 
The Conflict 
The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea—two of the poorest countries in the world—
began in 1998. Eritrea was once part of the Ethiopian empire, but it was colonized by 
Italy from 1869 to 1941. Following Italy's defeat in World War II, the United Nations 
determined that Eritrea would become part of Ethiopia, though Eritrea would maintain a 
great deal of autonomy. In 1961 Ethiopia removed Eritrea's independence, and Eritrea 
became just another Ethiopian province. In 1991 following a revolution in Ethiopia, 
Eritrea gained its independence. However, the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
had never been clearly marked. Following arguments and skirmishes, Eritrea invaded 
the area of Ethiopia it viewed as its own. Trench warfare—and the deaths of many 








 Ethiopia believes that Eritrea charges an exorbitant fee to export Ethiopian coffee 
through the Eritrean port. 
 
 There is conflict regarding use of the U.S. dollar for transactions, instead of local 
currency. 
 
Over two hundred thousand troops are massed at the border between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, waiting for the next outbreak of violence in a war that has been fought off and 
on since 1998. Ethiopia and Eritrea are two of the poorest countries in the world. Yet 
poverty has not prevented a war that appears to be more about sovereignty and 
national pride than about the few square miles of land around which fighting has been 
concentrated. Ostensibly at issue is which country controls approximately two hundred 
square miles of territory along the border of the two states. The land that is disputed is 
not of great value; it is scrubland, where farmers have traditionally raised a few hardy 
crops and grazed their goats. For Eritrea, this scrubland represents their claim to 
sovereignty and the victory they won in a thirty-year civil war against Ethiopia. To the 
Ethiopian government the issue is one of defending against this and any possible future 
Eritrean incursions into their territory. 
Few people outside of those living in the Horn of Africa, an eastern outcropping on the 
continent of Africa including the countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti, and 
a few academic experts understand why these countries are fighting, but the whole 
world has remarked upon the particular brutality of this war. The Ethiopian-Eritrean 
border war has attracted international attention for the tactics used by each side. After 
taking a few miles of Ethiopian territory, the Eritrean army dug in and began to use 
trench warfare to defend their territorial acquisitions. In response the Ethiopian army 
used the time-honored method for combating trench warfare—rushing the trenches in 
human waves in order to capture the enemy. This method of fighting has led to a large 
and mounting death toll on both sides. Though the numbers are disputed, it is estimated 
that seventy thousand soldiers from both sides have died. The rest of the world has 
been stunned by methods of fighting that have not been used for such an extended 
period of time since World War I. 
In addition to the staggering death toll, this war has also been characterized by the use 
of land mines against both combatants and civilians. When the Eritrean army retreated 
from the territory it had captured initially, it left fields and scrubland filled with landmines, 
making farming impossible and a re-establishment of the Ethiopian administration 
difficult. Ecologically, the effects of this war will be felt for years, both because of the 
presence of so many landmines and due to the effect that the fighting has had on the 
fragile, semi-arid ecosystem, now polluted with shell casings, wrecked military 
equipment and the refuse of two armies. 
Prior to the war, relations between the two countries had been friendly enough that 
many Eritreans lived in Ethiopia—the larger country with more economic opportunities. 
When the war began, the Ethiopian government became distrustful of Eritreans living 
within its borders and began to round them up and forcibly expel them, often without 
even allowing them to gather up other family members. Approximately fifty-five 
thousand Eritreans living in Ethiopia have been so expelled. Other Eritreans left 
voluntarily to avoid being forcibly removed. 
While the expulsion of citizens has primarily affected Eritreans, an estimated three 
hundred fifty thousand Ethiopians have been moved from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, 
where most of the fighting has occurred. During the first year of the war, the Eritrean 
army bombed towns in Tigray and terrorized the local population. The Ethiopian air 
force also bombed civilian areas until an agreement between the two sides was reached 
to stop the air war. The on-again, off-again nature of the fighting discouraged Ethiopians 
from returning to their homes. The failure of peace talks, and the development of new 
fronts in the fighting has also discouraged local residents from returning to the areas 
under dispute or near the disputed areas. 
 
Historical Background 
In 1974 the Ethiopian Revolution ended the longest ruling monarchy in African history. 
Haile Selassie, the well-known emperor and statesman, was deposed in a revolution 
caused by inequality and lack of development and democracy within Ethiopia. The 
Marxist government that took over power was called the Dergue, which is the Amharic 
word for committee. (Amharic is the language of Ethiopia.) But what was supposed to 
be a committee quickly turned into a dictatorship under the control of Mengistu Haile 
Mariam. Shortly after the revolution, Mengistu began to purge the country of dissent in 
what was called the "Red Terror." Many young people died, others fled the country or 
joined armed opposition groups in the countryside. 
Opposition to the state was already going on in the northern province of Eritrea, where 
fighting dated back to 1961. In 1961 the Ethiopian state abolished any autonomy held 
by the Eritrean region. Though it was at one point part of the Ethiopian empire, the 
Italian colonization of Eritrea from 1869 until 1941 gave it a distinctly different history 
than the rest of the Ethiopian state, which had never been colonized. When Italy was 
defeated in World War II, it was forced to give up its colonies. A United Nations 
commission decided what should be done with the Italian colonies in Africa: Eritrea, 
Libya and Italian Somaliland. It was determined that Eritrea should be united with 
Ethiopia, but that it should be allowed to keep its own laws, flag and language. Eritrea, 
therefore, had some autonomy from 1952 until 1961, when Haile Selassie decided to 
end what Eritrean autonomy existed. In 1961 Eritrea was stripped of its distinctive 
government and became simply another province of Ethiopia. It was at that time that 
fighting began between Eritreans who supported complete independence from Ethiopia 
and the Ethiopian state. 
Armed opposition to the Ethiopian state continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Opposition to the Ethiopian government grew during the Ethiopian famine that occurred 
in 1985. The government was thought to have responded too slowly and to have 
favored certain regions with food aid. By the late 1980s, the Ethiopian state was 
threatened by organized rebel groups throughout the countryside. These groups were 
organized along ethnic lines with the Oromo supporting the Oromo Liberation Front, the 
Tigrayans supporting the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritreans 
supporting the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). 
These rebel groups began to coordinate their offensive actions in the late 1980s, a 
strategy that proved very successful. The TPLF began reaching out to other ethnic 
groups to form an umbrella organization called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF included groups representing most of the 
major ethnicities in Ethiopia apart from the Eritreans. Eritreans were not included 
because it was accepted by the EPRDF that Eritrean independence would become 
inevitable should the Ethiopian government be overthrown. 
In 1999 as a result of coordinating efforts among the rebel groups, as well as the 
weakness of the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian state underwent 
a "second revolution." Mengistu Haile Mariam fled to Zimbabwe where he now lives in 
exile and the EPRDF took over the capital city of Addis Ababa. The Eritreans 
established an independent state in the north, which became officially independent after 
a 1993 United Nations sponsored referendum. The separation was accomplished in a 
friendly manner with Ethiopia taking complete responsibility for the foreign debt and the 
Eritreans being left with substantial resources and control over the port of Assab. 
The leaders of the two countries knew each other and had cooperated with one another 
in the overthrow of the previous state. Both countries realized that the border between 
them had not been properly demarcated and it was assumed that Eritrea's boundaries 
would be the boundaries it had prior to its incorporation into the Ethiopian state in 1952. 
But this proved to be a problem because the borders of Eritrea prior to 1952 were not 
clearly defined. There were multiple maps of the border area, most of which marked the 
border as a straight line, in spite of the fact that administration of the areas followed the 
jagged boundary of a river.  Perhaps because the Italians always desired to take over 
more of Ethiopia, they did not clearly identify the southern border of Eritrea. To resolve 
the confusion regarding the border, Ethiopia and Eritrea formed a border commission in 
1993 to discuss the border problem. The commission met from 1993 through 1997, but 
conflicts between local peoples in the border areas continued during this period. At 
issue was the question of who had the right to farm the territory. Eritrean people 
complained of harassment and fines imposed by Ethiopian officials and the confiscation 
of animals. Neither side seemed certain which farmers—Ethiopians or Eritreans—
should be able to plant crops. 
Serious economic problems between the two countries began in 1997. Ethiopia was, at 
that point, already angry with Eritrea about what Ethiopia viewed to be excessively high 
port charges to export its coffee crop through Assab. The two countries shared a 
common currency, the Ethiopian birr, and Ethiopia was upset that Eritrea was using birr 
to acquire dollars and thereby tightening the money supply in both countries. In 1997, 
Eritrea came out with its own currency called the nakfa. Ethiopia insisted that interstate 
transactions be conducted in dollars, which put economic pressure on Eritrea as it then 
had to pay for imports of food and other Ethiopian resources in dollars. By the end of 
1997 tensions between the two countries had risen to an all time high. 
 
What Really Happened at Badme? 
The confrontation began when armed Eritrean troops crossed the de facto border at 
Badme. According to the Ethiopian government, Eritrean troops entered Ethiopia in 
violation of an existing agreement that prohibited the crossing of the border by armed 
military personnel. Ethiopian police reminded the Eritrean soldiers of this agreement 
and asked them to leave their weapons if they wished to enter Ethiopia. The Eritrean 
troops refused to comply and opened fire on the Ethiopian police, killing two police 
officers. 
The Eritreans claim that Badme is their own territory based on maps from the Italian 
colonial era. The Eritrean government alleges that after 1991 the Ethiopian government 
had a systematic policy of attempting to expand their northern province of Tigray 
through the acquisition of Eritrean territory. They claim that in 1992 Tigray 
administration officials crossed the true border and put new border markers deep in 
Eritrean territory. Subsequently Ethiopians from the Tigray region moved into this newly 
reclaimed area and Eritreans living there began to be harassed. Attempts to peacefully 
resolve the conflict were allegedly met with further territorial aggression and harassment 
by the Ethiopians until the Eritrean troops were called into protect the interests of the 
local people. 
Ethiopia acknowledged that there are problems with the demarcation of the border 
between the two countries. However, Eritrean movement into the Badme area was seen 
as aggressive due to the fact that Badme had never been administered by an Eritrean 
government, not since 1991 and not during the Italian colonial period. The bilateral 
border commission had been established to resolve the border conflicts, but the Eritrean 
military takeover of Badme moved the dispute from diplomacy to armed conflict. 
 
The Leaders 
Meles Zenawi has been the head of the Ethiopian government since 1991 when the 
EPRDF overthrew the government of dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam. He became prime 
minister of the current government of Ethiopia in 1995 after his party won elections 
under the new Ethiopian constitution. Prime Minister Meles, as he is properly called in 
Ethiopia where a person's last name is simply their father's first name, was born 
Legesse Zenawi. He comes from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, from the town of Adwa, 
a historic and revered site in Ethiopia. Adwa is the place where the Ethiopian army was 
able to fend off Italian colonization efforts in 1896. 
Zenawi went to high school in Addis Ababa and started college where he studied 
medicine. The Ethiopian Revolution occurred in 1974 and Meles interrupted his studies 
to fight against the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam. He joined an organization 
that was later to become the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front orTPLF. The TPLF is 
currently the dominant party in the coalition of parties that makes up the EPRDF. 
Zenawi is known as being both bright and energetic. He earned a masters degree after 
the 1991 success of the rebels. He collaborated with Issayas Afeworki, now president of 
Eritrea, in the attempt to overthrow the Dergue government. The two were reported to 
be friends prior to the beginning of tensions that ultimatelyled to the border war. 
Issayas Afeworki is also of the Tigrayan ethnic group, though he was raised on the 
Eritrean side of the border. He is well respected for his intelligence and his 'everyman' 
quality. President Issayas (the Eritreans have the same naming convention as 
Ethiopians) is known to drive around Asmara (the capital of Eritrea) in an old Toyota 
and live modestly with his wife and three children.  
Issayas Afeworki was active in fighting for Eritrean independence since 1967. He 
helped to form the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) as a joint effort between 
Muslims and Christians aimed at the independence of Eritrea. When Eritrea became 
independent in 1993, the National Assembly elected Issayas head of state. Shortly 
thereafter, the EPLF dropped its military name and became the People's Front for 
Democracy and Justice or PFDJ. 
The similarity in the backgrounds of these two leaders—they both come from the same 
region and have both worked their way up in the hierarchies of their groups during an 
active conflict—could have led to a positive rapport and the ability to communicate 
amicably. However, this has not been the case. Since the outbreak of active fighting 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, speeches and statements by the two leaders have done 
more to escalate the conflict than to diffuse it. Indeed, both leaders appear to feel 
justified in the use of force to protect their border and perceived violations of 
sovereignty. 
 
Recent History and the Future 
Efforts at Resolution 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has developed a three-pronged peace 
agreement that has been supported by the United Nations, the European Union and the 
United States. The three prongs of the agreement consist of the Framework Agreement, 
the Modalities, and the Technical Arrangements. The agreement was developed in 
consultation with Eritrea and Ethiopia and adopted by the OAU in July of 1999. 
However, it has not yet led to peace, because Ethiopia has refused to sign the 
Technical Arrangements. 
Both parties to the dispute have agreed that the United Nations will determine the 
demarcation of the border. However, though the end result is decided, obstacles to a 
formal agreement remain. Ethiopia objects to the Technical Arrangements document 
that would lead to the final settlement, because it does not entail a return to the situation 
before the outbreak of fighting. The primary obstacles to conclusion of the process and 
an Ethiopian/Eritrea agreement are: the specific identification of all areas that are 
currently occupied and agreement on the movement of troops out of the areas of 
conflict; the alteration of the Technical Arrangements so that a U.N. Peacekeeping 
Force would be replaced by a much smaller OAU observer mission and; the restoration 
of civilian control in all areas from which troops withdraw. Ethiopia is adamant that it will 
not agree to the Technical Arrangements until there is a guarantee in place to return 
control of all territories to what they were before the whole conflict began. 
The peace agreement has been on the table now for over a year with little evidence that 
Ethiopia is ready to sign the Technical Arrangements in their current form. Frequent 
diplomatic interventions and appeals from the United States and other countries have 
had no success. Eritrea appears frustrated by Ethiopia's demands and argues that the 
Technical Arrangements are not open to amendment. Eritrea appears to be afraid that if 
it accepts the changes to the Technical Arrangements that Ethiopia is demanding, 
Ethiopia will get the disputed territory back and reestablish control of the area. In this 
scenario, Eritrea will ultimately be the loser, as the problems that initiated its incursions 
into Ethiopian territory will not be solved. 
Several countries have made efforts to mediate the conflict and achieve agreement on 
the Technical Arrangements. Libya, Algeria and the United States have all sent high-
level diplomatic missions to shuttle between the two leaders in an effort to bridge the 
gap between the positions of Eritrea and Ethiopia regarding the Technical 
Arrangements. However, each side has refused to budge from his position and none of 
the international diplomatic missions have so far been successful. Mediators are 
frustrated by the fact that both countries have agreed to the eventual U.N. demarcation 
of the border, but are unable to take the steps needed to calm the military conflict and 
enable the demarcation to take place. 
While attempts are ongoing behind the scenes to bring the conflict to resolution, both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea have been engaging in a war of words that mirrors the war on the 
ground. Ethiopia has repeatedly referred to the "aggression" of Eritrea. The foreign 
minister of Eritrea has argued, "For our part, we will condemn and challenge any force 
or power which forces us to withdraw from our own land and sovereignty" (Tseghenay 
1/27/99). It does not appear likely that they will reach a settlement soon. 
 
Extension into Other Countries 
While Asmara and Addis Ababa (the capital of Ethiopia) have made no further progress 
toward peace after the initial OAU agreement, the border conflict has expanded into 
other countries in the Horn of Africa. In an attempt to destabilize Ethiopia by 
encouraging conflicts within it, Eritrea has supported rebel movements by several 
different groups opposing the Ethiopian state. The Eritrean government has been 
funneling money and arms to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which has been 
fighting the Ethiopian state in southern Ethiopia. It has also been supporting Al-Ithad Al-
Islami, an Islamic group that supports the secession of the Ogaden area of Ethiopia. 
Aiding these groups is a deliberate and somewhat successful attempt to destabilize 
Ethiopia and engage Ethiopian security forces in places other than Eritrea. 
However, Eritrea's funding of rebel groups has resulted in an extension of the 
Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict to parts of Kenya and Somalia. Ethiopian forces have 
pursued OLF rebels over the Ethiopian border and into both Kenya and Somalia. In 
addition, Ethiopian troops have attacked the forces of Somali warlord Husain Aideed 
inside the Somali border because of his alliance with Eritrea. The Somalis have lodged 
a complaint with the U.N. Security Council and the Organization of African Unity, 
protesting Ethiopian involvement in their territory, but because of the conflict with Eritrea 
and with the rebel groups, Ethiopia is unlikely to stop. Ethiopian relations with Djibouti 
remain strong because all Ethiopian exports are now passing through the port there. 
There is a great deal of international pressure for Ethiopia and Eritrea to solve the 
border conflict. Any lasting solution must include a way for both the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean leaderships to save face by claiming victory. Since both sides have agreed that 
a U.N. team should survey the border area and determine where the border should be, 
the only obstacle to resolving the dispute is to develop an agreement on the terms of 
the cease-fire and troop withdrawals. However, after eighteen months of negotiations 
and third party interventions there is no progress toward agreement on these issues. 
The chief obstacle to achieving troop withdrawals is a lack of trust on each side. The 
Ethiopians do not trust the Eritreans to withdraw to the positions they held prior to the 
outbreak of fighting and the Eritreans do not trust that the Ethiopians will negotiate a 
new border in good faith once they give up the armed conflict. A solution to this conflict 
has been in sight virtually since the beginning of fighting. These two countries have 
been unable to see past their immediate security interests and distrust of one another to 
achieve that solution. The Eritreans fought Ethiopia for thirty years to achieve their 
independence. Both countries are capable of fighting a long war driven by issues of 
pride and perceived threats to sovereignty in spite of their relative lack of resources. 
 
Chronology 
 May 6, 1998 Conflict begins as several Eritrean soldiers enter Badme. 
 
 May 12, 1998 Mechanized brigades of Eritrean soldiers conquere the town of 
Badme. 
 
 June 5, 1998 Eritrea bombs the town of Mekelle in the Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia, hitting a school as well as other targets. 
 
 June 9, 1998 War breaks out on a second front around the town of Zala 
Ambesa, the main road between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
 
 June 11, 1998 Fighting occurs on a third front, close to Assab. Eritrea bombs 
Adigrat in the Tigray region. 
 
 July 1998 Eritrean students studying at the University of Addis Ababa are 
arrested and sent to a detention camp in Bilate. Other Eritreans living in Ethiopia 
are forced to return to Eritrea. 
 
 August 1998 Ethiopia shoots down a jet en route to South Africa when it enters 
the no-fly zone along the northern border area. Two European civilians are killed. 
 
 November 1998 Ethiopia accepts the OAU Framework Agreement. 
 
 February 6, 1999 Ethiopia launches an offensive in which it reclaims Badme and 
takes Eritrean territory inland from the Badme front. 
 
 February 10, 1999 U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1227, which 
establishes an arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
 
 February 27, 1999 Eritrea accepts the OAU Framework Agreement. 
 
 2000 Ethiopia invades Eritrea. 
 
Biography: 
Haile Sellassie (1892-1975) 
Haile Sellassie was born near Harer, Ethiopia on July 23, 1892. His name at birth was 
Tafari Makonnen. Ras ("prince") Tafari displayed keen intellectual abilities early in his 
studies, and by the age of fourteen was appointed provincial governor. Upon his 
coronation as emperor of Ethiopia in 1930, he took the name Haile Sellassie, which 
means "might of the trinity." He was also granted the title "Conquering Lion of the Tribe 
of Judah, Elect of God and King of the Kings of Ethiopia." 
Haile Sellassie led his country while in exile for a time during World War II. In 1941 he 
returned to power in Ethiopia. Early in his rule, he was considered a progressive 
reformer, who outlawed slavery and introduced educational, economic, and social 
reforms. He helped found the Organization of African Unity in 1963. However, as 
famine, economic depression, and the Eritrean crises worsened conditions in Ethiopia, 
he lost support. Sellassie was deposed by military mutiny in 1974, and lived under 
house arrest until his death on August 26, 1975. 
In addition to having served as Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930-74, he is worshipped as 
a divine being by followers of the Afro-Caribbean Rastafarian religion. 
 
Trench Warfare 
Ethiopia and Eritrea are involved in trench warfare—soldiers wait in trenches for the 
opposition to try to push them back. During World War I, European soldiers fought foot-
by-foot over much of their continent. One of the most powerful descriptions of trench 
warfare is in Erich Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front: 
The front is a cage from which we must await fearfully whatever may happen. We 
lie under the network of arching shells and live in a suspense of uncertainty. Over 
us, Chance hovers. If a shot comes, we can duck, that is all; we neither know nor 
can determine where it will fall.  
At regular intervals we ram the iron stakes. Two men hold a roll and the others 
spool off the barbed wire. It is that awful stuff with close-set, long spikes. I am not 
used to unrolling it and tear my hand.  
We must look out for our bread. The rats have become much more numerous 
lately because the trenches are no longer in good condition...it is a sure sign of a 
coming bombardment. The rats here are particularly repulsive. They are so fat—
the kind we all call corpse-rats. They have shocking, evil, naked faces, and it is 
nauseating to see their long, nude tails.  
The bombardment does not diminish. It is falling in the rear too. As far as one 
can see spout fountains of mud and iron.... Our trench is almost gone. At many 
places it is only eighteen inches high, it is broken by holes, and craters, and 
mountains of earth. A shell lands square in front of our post. At once it is dark. 
We are buried and must dig ourselves out.  
The days are hot and the dead lie unburied. We cannot fetch them all in, if we did 
we should not know what to do with them. The shells will bury them. Many have 
their bellies swollen up like balloons. They hiss, belch, and make movements. 
The gasses in them make noises.  
One morning two butterflies play in front of our trench. They are brimstone 
butterflies, with red spots on their yellow wings. What can they be looking for 
here? There is not a plant nor a flower for miles. They settle on the teeth of a 
skull.... 
Attack, counter-attack, charge, repulse—these are words, but what things they signify! 
We have lost a great many men, mostly recruits.... Although we need reinforcements, 
the recruits give us almost more trouble than they are worth. They are helpless in this 
grim fighting area, they fall like flies. Modern trench-warfare demands knowledge and 
experience; a man must have a feeling for the contours of the ground, an ear for the 
sound and character of the shells, must be able to decide beforehand where they will 
drop, how they will burst and how to shelter from them. The young recruits know none 
of these things. They get killed simply because they hardly can tell shrapnel from high 
explosive.... They flock together like sheep instead of scattering, and even the wounded 
are shot down like hares by the airmen. 
 
Military Spending 
Fighting a war is expensive. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have used precious resources 
and valuable foreign currency to improve their military capabilities since the fighting 
began in 1998. Prior to 1999, both countries used airplanes, artillery and tanks that 
were supplied to them, primarily by the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. Once the 
conflict began, Ethiopia purchased fifty-five new tanks from Ukraine as well as Sukhoi-
27 fighter planes. The Eritreans have purchased new Mig-29 jets and surface-to-air 
missiles. 
Between their new purchases and the daily expenses of war, such as ammunition, 
salaries for soldiers, and food and medical equipment, both sides have significantly 
increased their military spending. In May, 2000 the United Nations Security Council 
passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo on both Ethiopia and Eritrea. The arms 
embargo occurred both as a result of renewed fighting and because of estimates that 
both sides in the conflict were spending a million dollars a day on military purchases. 
Both countries have raised funds for the war through an increase in taxation, enforced 
"contributions" by citizens, and donations to the cause from Ethiopians and Eritreans 
living abroad. In addition, Eritrea has received contributions toward its military budget 
from the governments of Qatar and Libya. Eritrea does not make the figures pertaining 
to its military spending public. Estimates are that both countries were spending around 
$100 million dollars per year on defense prior to the outbreak of the war in 1998. Recent 
data from the Institute of Strategic Studies in London suggests that the 1999 spending 
by both countries had skyrocketed with Ethiopia increasing its budget to $480 million 
and Eritrea to $306 million. 
The U.S. State Department estimates that Eritrea spent 7.8 percent of its Gross 
National Product (GDP) on military expenses in 1997, and Ethiopia spent 1.9 percent on 
military expenses in 1997. These percentages can be tripled or quadrupled to account 
for military spending since the outbreak of the war in 1998. This makes Eritrea, a poor 
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